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Last July, we told you about a Court of Appeals decision dealing with whether a CGL policy covered a cyberware attack. That court held that there was no coverage. But the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and decided that there are issues of fact that must first be resolved.

G&G Oil bought a CGL policy from Continental. Among other things, that policy covered “commercial crime,” which was defined as a loss “resulting directly from the use of any computer to fraudulently cause a transfer of that property.” A ransomware attack locked G&G Oil out of its computer system in November 2017. G&G Oil paid the ransom, and it regained access to its computers.
The economic loss doctrine prevents a party who suffers only economic damages from recovering those damages in tort. But this case shows that the Court of Appeals may be open to limiting its application in appropriate cases.

Ivy Quad is a condominium complex in South Bend. Its developer was Ivy Quad Development, LLC, a now insolvent company that was owned by David Matthews. The general contractor, Matthews, LLC, and designer, DMTM, Inc., are also owned and managed by David. His wife, Velvet, was also involved in the design, construction, development, and sale of Ivy Quad units. The Court referred to these collectively as the “Matthews Defendants.”
Last May, we told you about a decision from the Court of Appeals dealing with liability after an asset-only purchase. The Court of Appeals found that there was a de facto merger when the assets were bought, so the new company was liable for the debts of the old. The Indiana Supreme Court was sufficiently intrigued by this subject to grant transfer.

Nello was founded in 2002 to manufacture utility and cellphone towers. Four senior officers of the company owned 95% of the shares; the remaining shares were held by three different people. The company moved its operations to South Bend in 2016, but this move was more difficult than anticipated, leaving the company “cash-strapped.” Its debts included $1.4 million owed to the City of South Bend; $3.4 million to Live Oak Capital; and over $10 million to Fifth Third Bank. The four senior officers had signed personal guarantees for the Fifth Third loan.
This case centers on the extent to which a party must update the incorrect testimony of one of its witnesses and the proper remedy if it does not do so.

Bahney attended a basketball game at Notre Dame in 2014. While walking behind one of the baskets, Bahney tripped over a riser and broke her shoulder. Bahney sued, claiming that the floor was not safe and a failure to warn.
Sometimes parents do things for their children that are well-meaning, but not REALLY meant. This case shows the consequences of one of these kinds of decisions.

Martin invested $50,000 in a money market account in 1998, and he named him and his daughter, Lindsey, as joint owners, which was defined as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Lindsey did not contribute any funds to the account.
In this case, the plaintiff’s attorney encountered a nightmare for any proponent of an expert witness—the witness started saying unnecessary things that could call his qualifications as an expert into question. The situation was so bad that the trial court entered a directed verdict for the defense. But was that correct?

Scholl filed a lawsuit accusing Majd of medical malpractice related to a lumbar fusion surgery and a subsequent revision procedure he performed on her. After Scholl and Majd both testified at trial, Scholl call her third witness, Sexton, to testify as an expert witness. While on the stand he said that Majd’s treatment fell “below the mythical standard of care of doing spine surgery.” When pressed on what he meant by “mythical,” Sexton said that the reasonable doctor standard was “not any specific thing you can put your finger on” and that doctors had “to figure [it] out by the seat of your pants.” To Sexton, “[t]here is no such thing as a standard of care except what the individual doctor thinks it is.” Sexton then went on to describe the manner in which he felt Majd’s performance fell below the standard of care.
This is a commercial case that arises from an unfortunate situation—a malfunctioning sewer lift station that flooded a retail shop in Castleton. The issues on appeal deal with expert opinions and the proper amount of damages, which can inform just about any case.

Conroad owned a building in Castleton that it leased to Pier 1. Pier 1’s lease was set to expire in 2016, but Pier 1 had the option to extend the lease for two 5-year terms. A sewer lift station maintained by the Association failed in 2015, flooding the store with sewage. Pier 1 terminated its lease as a result. Conroad was eventually able to re-lease the building, but at a lower base rent.
Lawyers have long sought to take the Latin out of the legal lexicon. But there are still a few holdouts, such as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This case addresses the burden a defendant must meet in order to get summary judgment when that doctrine is at issue.

The Griffins were shopping at Menard one day for a new bathroom vanity sink. Once they found one they liked, Walter reached up to pull the box off the shelf. Walter did not notice that the staples on the bottom of the box were loose, and the bottom of the box opened when he pulled it off the shelf. The sink fell on Walter and injured him.
Indiana has enacted statutes that deal with premises liability for nonprofit religious organizations. But the statute does not define what the “premises” of such an organization is. Instead, that was the task of the Court in this case.

Henderson drove to New Wineskin Church one morning for services. There were about 2 inches of snow on the ground that snowy morning, and Henderson knew that parking lots and roads could be slippery. When she arrived at church, Henderson parked in the parking lot and got out of her car. After two steps, she slipped and fell, injuring her shoulder, back, and neck.
Corporations are often liable for personal injuries as a result of a particular employee’s negligence. But what happens if the particular employee at issue is not liable? Does that absolve the corporation of liability? This case shows that it does not.

Magnolia runs an assisted living facility in Carmel where Hogan resided. One day, an employee caused a table to fall over, which injured Hogan. Hogan did not know the identity of the employee who caused the injury. Therefore, she identified the employee as “John Doe” when she filed her complaint against Magnolia.
Forum-selection clauses are common in many kinds of contracts. But you may not know that these clauses are sometimes void, as this case shows.

Sullivan hired Rabco for a construction project in Noblesville. The contract contained a forum-selection clause, which provided that any litigation be filed in Orange County, Florida.
The plaintiff in this case got the dream of every plaintiff’s attorney—a default judgment against a defendant with an apparent ability to pay. But the case was not done, because the defendant showed up to defend himself in a damages trial. This case is about that trial, and how the trial court erred when assessing damages.

Renner was a cheerleader and a good student at her local high school. In 2013, she fell from a swing set and suffered a concussion. She recovered, but suffered another concussion the next year when she fell during a cheerleading routine. She also recovered from this concussion, but these incidents made it more likely that she would suffer future concussions and more severe symptoms.
This case involves some defendants who behaved VERY badly. And it also shows that a plaintiff cannot rest on its laurels when encountering such behavior.

Trisler and Koeppen opened Greek’s Pizza, a pizza shop in Carmel, in 2014, under an LLC referred to in the opinion as GMRT. Later that year, they agreed to sell McLean a share of the business in exchange for $90,000. Thus, McLean owned 30% of the business, while Koeppen owned 45% and Trisler owned 25%. The three had no operating agreement. A bit later, Koeppen left the business, and his shares were divided pro rata between Trisler and McLean, leaving McLean the majority owner of GMRT.
The last case shows that a contractor cannot get around HICA’s provisions by refusing to bill a homeowner. This case addresses another way that a contractor tried to get around HICA’s provisions—by arguing that an amended version of the contract related back to the signing of the original contract.

Jenkins owned a home that was damaged during a severe storm. McGraw is a general contractor who focuses on storm remediation, and the two entered into a contract in June 2017 for the storm remediation at the price to be approved by Jenkins’ insurer. The contract said that it would terminate if insurance did not pay the claims. Moreover, it required that Jenkins pay 20% of the replacement cost value as liquidated damages if he cancelled the contract. McGraw estimated a total replacement cost of $170,559.63, but Jenkins’ insurer approved Jenkins’ claim with a replacement cost value of $109,371.97 and issued a total payment to Jenkins in the amount of $64,597.37. Jenkins decided not to complete the repairs and moved to Florida.
Indiana’s Home Improvement Contracts Act (HICA) protects homeowners by requiring that contractors doing home improvements give the homeowner certain information. But the Act does not apply to de minimis improvements—when the contract price is below $150. The question posed in this case is whether HICA’s contractual value requirement is based on the amount billed or the value of the job.

A tornado tore the roof off of the Klugers’ home. They filed a claim with their insurer, who hired Servpro to do cleanup and restoration work. A Servpro representative met with the Klugers and presented an electronic contract. Mr. Kluger could not see the contract on the iPad because of the bright light, and the representative told him where to sign. The contact did not provide many of the things required by HICA, including a description of the work to be done, an estimated cost, and an estimated date of completion.
People often disagree about how to run a business, and sometimes those disagreements can be so fundamental that the parties decide to split ways. This can cause problems with how to value the relative shares of the owners, and that problem is particularly acute if the person leaving is a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation. In this case, the Court addresses how those shares should be valued under Indiana law.

Hartman was an officer, director, and shareholder in BigInch. The shareholders were bound by a buyback clause. That clause required BigInch to repurchase a shareholder’s interest if the company involuntarily terminates the shareholder as an officer or director. And the clause further provided that the company must pay the shares’ “appraised market value” as determined by a third-party valuation company in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
Arbitration agreements are a regular part of everyday commercial life, even for consumers. And these agreements generally bind the parties to arbitration. The question posed in this case is the circumstances under which those agreements apply to nonparties.

Jane Doe II needed to move into an assisted living facility. Her legal guardian chose for Jane to stay in Carmel Senior Living (“CSL”). After the Guardian paid a deposit and arranged for Jane to move in, CSL emailed a residency contract that contained an arbitration agreement. The Guardian signed the agreement.
Molly Melton is an athletic trainer licensed by the Athletic Trainers Certification Board. The members of the Board are appointed by the governor and can impose disciplinary sanctions.

While working as an athletic trainer at a School, Melton, then twenty-three years old, began a sexual relationship with an eighteen-year-old male athlete (C.J.). C.J.’s parents discovered the relationship and filed a complaint with the school. Melton was fired and let her license lapse.
One may think that a person can always move to quash a subpoena directed to their records, even if the records are kept by a third-party. And this may be true—but you need to follow the proper procedure, or your efforts will come to naught.

Kristy and Clay Kelley married, had a child, and divorced. Kristy died after a disappearance in 2014, and her father, Kenneth Scales investigated her death. Scales became aware of facts which made him interested in Clay’s cell-phone records, and he
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This case arises from injuries a woman suffered while trying to care for a goat on another woman’s farm. It involves interesting questions around premises liability—so interesting that this is the second appeal we have reported on in this case. And while
the first dealt with whether a ram was a dangerous animal, this one deals with the law governing injuries to invitees.

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